Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker by Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf
Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary
union and the case for appointing an independent
central banker.∗
Revised version.
Corinne Aaron# - Hubert Kempf∗
# LAboratoire d’Economie Publique, Université Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 bd de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13
aaron@univ-paris1.fr
* Corresponding author.
EUREQua, Université Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,




We set up a model of a monetary union where decisions over mone-
tary policy are made through bargaining between two governments with
diﬀerent objectives. They can either choose to directly bargain over mon-
etary policy or to delegate monetary decisions to an independent central
banker. In the latter case, the choice of the central banker is obtained by
bargaining between the two governments.
We show that, the bargaining power being constant, the delegation of
monetary policy to an independent central banker does not necessarily
incur a smaller inﬂation bias nor is systematically welfare improving for
any government. It may happen that both governments are better-oﬀ
when they directly bargain.
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11 Introduction.
In this paper, we prove that the inﬂation bias in a monetary union may be
higher when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central banker
than when it is directly exerted by the relevant policymakers, in the presence
of bargaining. Moreover, it may happen that both policymakers are better oﬀ
when they directly bargain over monetary policy decisions. Economic theory
gives credit to the advantages of appointing an independent conservative central
banker. Rogoﬀ (1985) showed that the delegation of monetary policy to an
independent central banker was a means to reduce the inﬂationary bias due
to the time inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Delegating
monetary policy to an independent central banker means that the latter has
his own preferences with respect to monetary policy (which diﬀer from the
government’s) and chooses monetary policy accordingly, without interference
from the government. The government cannot override the central banker,
give him instructions nor dismiss him.1 Following this seminal paper, a large
body of literature has grown up over the past years2 and nowadays it is widely
believed that a high level of independence is an eﬃcient institutional device to
assure price stability. However, there is still an on-going debate on the empirical
validity of Rogoﬀ’s claim.3
Rogoﬀ’s result was obtained in a one-region monetary economy with a
unique policymaker. This representation may be oversimpliﬁed. Indeed, the
nomination of the authority in charge of monetary policy is the result of an
intricate process of negotiations, bargaining and compromises between agents
whose preferences regarding monetary policy are not identical. Blinder (1997),
drawing from his experience as a member of the FOMC, stressed that ”mone-
tary policy decisions are made by a committee” and that ”committee discussions
must aggregate preferences, seek common ground and somehow produce group
decision”.4 In many countries, the choice of the central bank committee does
not only stem from the executive’s preferences but involves as well the legislative
body. In the United States, members of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System are chosen by the U.S. president subject to Senate conﬁrma-
tion.5 The case of the European Monetary Union is particularly interesting. It
1This deﬁnition is close to the one used in Lohmann (1992) and Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts
(1998). Both papers distinguish between central bank independence and conservatism. There
exist other delegation shemes than ”appointing an optimally inﬂation averse central banker”
that we do not consider in the present paper (see the literature on inﬂation targeting or on
performance contracts for instance). Finally, there are other reasons that justify the appoint-
ment of an independent central banker, beyond inﬂation aversion: the existence of political
pressures related to the political business cycles, the fear of monetization of public deﬁcits.
Here, we do not envisage these cases as they would necessitate other more adequate models.
2For a literature review, see for example Gärtner (2000), Persson and Tabellini (1990,
1999), Walsh (1998), Cukierman (1992).
3For critical approaches of the literature, see McCallum (1995, 1997), Blinder (1997) and
Forder (1998 a,b). Forder, in the latter paper, discusses the nomination process of a central
banker. He argues against interpreting Rogoﬀ’s results as a fanciful approach to public sector
appointments.
4see Blinder (1997), p.16.
5For a description of the Federal Reserve System, see Havrilesky (1993). Havrilesky stresses
2perfectly exempliﬁes the occurrence of bargaining between political actors for
the choice of the central banker: the president of the ECB (and the members
of its Executive Board) are chosen by the Council of Ministers and Heads of
State, after some tight bargaining between the EMU member states.6
Hence, it appears necessary to take into account the negotiations process
leading to the nomination of an independent central banker and assess the im-
portance of this process in the conduct of monetary policy in a monetary union,
as this may modify the conclusions about the desirability of delegation. This
is precisely the purpose of this paper. We address the delegation issue in the
case of a two-country monetary union. Given the plural nature of a monetary
union, monetary policy matters are solved by a bargaining process between
the governments ruling the two countries. We want to relate the properties
of monetary policy decided by an independent central banker to the diverging
views of political policymakers which are involved in the nomination of the cen-
tral banker. Moreover, we want to compare the outcome of monetary policy
through delegation with the outcome obtained when political policymakers di-
rectly bargain over monetary policy. Is it true in this case that delegation always
generates a reduced inﬂationary bias? Is delegation always preferable to direct
bargaining over monetary policy? We answer negatively to both questions.
Hence, bargaining in a monetary union appears to notably weaken the case for
delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker, emphasized by
Rogoﬀ (1985).
Few papers have been devoted to the relationship between the sharing of
political power and the nomination process of monetary policymakers. Waller
(1992, 2000) examines the appointment procedure by which the party in power
proposes a candidate for a vacant seat on the central bank committee and the
opposite party may veto the proposal. He shows that delegating monetary
policy to an independent central banker or policy board reduces the variability
induced by policy uncertainty and produces a better outcome than what would
be produced by elected leaders. However, our paper diﬀers from Waller’s as we
do not consider political partisanship nor electoral cycles. Moreover, we do not
consider the same appointment process but a Nash bargaining game.7
We develop a model of a monetary union with two political policymakers,
bargaining and uncertainty. The political policymakers can be thought of as
national governments in a multi-national monetary union, like the EMU. We
can also think of our monetary union as a two-sector economy. In this case, our
policymakers can be thought of as political parties, special interest, agencies or
in his various contributions to the study of American monetary policy the importance of
pressures exerted on the monetary policy-makers. In particular, the power of appointment to
the FOMC appears to be critical for inﬂuencing the course of monetary policy.
6The appointment of the ﬁrst ECB president in May 1998, the Dutch central banker W.
Duisenberg, was subject to bargaining and compromises between member states: as some
countries supported W. Duisenberg while some others -especially France- supported J.C.
Trichet, member states agreed on the appointment of W. Duisenberg with an informal com-
mitment that he would resign after four years and leave the post to J.-C Trichet. J.-C. Trichet
succeeding him in November 2003.
7Sibert (2003) looks at committees as monetary policymakers. Here we consider a unique
central banker.
3branches of government, each one acting on behalf of a given economic sector.8
For the sake of simplicity, we adopt in the paper the ﬁrst interpretation and
we shall refer to national governments.9 Each government is characterized by a
speciﬁc loss function, the arguments of which are a national output gap and the
union’s inﬂation level. These functions diﬀer according to the weight given to
the inﬂation objective relative to the output one, that is governments diﬀer in
terms of ”monetary” conservatism, as deﬁned by Rogoﬀ (1985). Moreover, the
two countries are hit by idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, the two economies diﬀer
because of the diﬀerences in the preferences of governments and/or the idiosyn-
crasies of shocks. We compare two designs for monetary policy. Governments
can either choose to delegate the discretionary decision making power to an
independent central banker or jointly decide over monetary policy. In the ﬁrst
case, they bargain over the characteristics of the central banker to be selected,
i.e. his degree of conservatism; in the other case, they directly bargain over
monetary supply. In either case, we assume that a Nash bargaining process
takes place.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in the following
section. Section 3 is devoted to the study of the bargaining game over the choice
of an independent central banker and the properties of its solution. Then, we
compare in section 4 the outcome of this delegation game with the outcome of
direct bargaining over monetary policy. Section 5 contains a summary of our
results and concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a two-country economy with two national governments jointly re-
sponsible for monetary policy. We follow the usual analytical framework used
in the literature devoted to monetary policy games (Barro and Gordon, 1983,
Rogoﬀ, 1985). We assume that the inﬂation rate is directly controlled by the
central bank.
In each country (indexed by i), the aggregate supply function is given by:
yit = y +( πt − πe
t)+εit,i =1 ,2 (1)
where yit denotes the national output level in country i in period t, y the natural
output level, πt and πe
t respectively the actual inﬂation rate and the expected
inﬂation rate in the monetary union and εit is an i.i.d. supply shock, speciﬁct o
country i with mean zero and variance σ2
i. T h et w os h o c k sa r en o tc o r r e l a t e d . 10
8Faust (1996) underlines that the Fed’s structure (which emerged in legislation between
1913 and 1935) was a response to conﬂicts over redistributive powers (in particular, to the di-
verging views of the farmers and small businessmen on one hand and the ﬁnancial community
on the other hand): the FOMC voting power has been divided between Reserve Bank presi-
dents and politically appointed governors (which implies a sharing of the appointment power).
For an historical account of the creation of the Federal Reserve System, see Timberlake (1993).
9With minor modiﬁcations, however, our model could sustain the second interpretation.
10The case of non-zero correlation between shocks could be addressed at the expense of
additional complexities.
4We denote by θ ≡ σ2
2/σ2
1 the ratio of variances. The two countries are of equal
size.
Whatever its institutional determination process, given the linear-quadratic
framework we use, money supply is a linear function of the aggregate supply
shock:
πt = β + αεt
where β is the inﬂationary bias of monetary policy and εt ≡ 1/2(ε1t + ε2t).
Each government’s objective is to minimize an expected loss function, cor-
responding to the welfare of residents in its country. The loss function depends
on the diﬀerence between the actual inﬂation rate and an inﬂation target, as-
sumed to be nil for simplicity reasons on the one hand, and the gap between
actual output and a target value for output y∗ on the other hand. Again for
simplicity reasons, the target values for both governments are assumed to be
identical. We denote k ≡ y∗ − y>0.










where λi represents the relative weight given to inﬂation by government i. In
the sequel, we shall refer to λi as the degree of conservatism of government i.
Hence, the two governments’ loss functions diﬀer by means of the impact of
idiosyncratic shocks and their aversion to inﬂation, that is by their willingness
to ﬁght inﬂation. We assume without loss of generality that λ1 >λ 2.
The target output level y∗ is bigger than the natural output level y because
of distortions on the labor market (by means of some anti-competitive features
or restrictions to trade). Hence, the monetary authority is tempted to produce
unanticipated inﬂation so as to reduce the gap between actual output and its
target level. In such conditions, an announced policy decision, in particular
the optimal one, is (in general) not credible when it is not backed by a com-
mitment technology, and the authority in charge of money supply must adopt
a discretionary policy leading to a positive inﬂation bias (Barro and Gordon,
1983).
We assume that, once appointed, the central banker considers the monetary
union’s macroeconomic outcome. Then, a candidate to the position of central
banker has preferences which depend on inﬂation and the aggregate output gap
(yt − y∗) where yt ≡ 1/2(y1t + y2t).W ea s s u m et h a th eh a st h es a m et a r g e t
levels as both governments and can only diﬀer because of the weight coeﬃcient









where λB represents the relative weight given to inﬂation by this individual,
hence his inﬂation aversion, or equivalently, his degree of conservatism. We
11The proper welfare objective is the minimization of the future discounted value of the




t−1Lt],w h e r eδ is the discount factor (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1).
However, since there is no dynamics, the problem of minimizing the intertemporal loss function
is equivalent to the static problem of minimizing the expected per-period loss function (2).
5shall consider a continuum of candidates depending on this relative weight λB,
(λB ∈ [0,+∞]).
Each government wants to minimize its expected loss function. The degree
of conservatism of the central banker is chosen by bargaining and is a function
of the degrees of conservatism of both governments λ1 and λ2, the (Nash)
bargaining ratio γ, and the variances of shocks σ2
1 and σ2
2. When γ is equal to







We shall introduce the following notations:
• λB1 (λB2) denotes the degree of conservatism of the central banker cho-














• The loss of a given government is always a function of the degree of con-
servatism of both governments and the bargaining ratio γ, but depends
on the institutional setting within which monetary policy is decided. In






























) represents the loss
of government 1 (2).12
3 Delegation with bargaining.
In this section, we study the properties of the solution of the delegation game.
There are three stages in the game. In the ﬁrst stage, both governments bargain
over the type (the degree of conservatism) of the central banker to be named.
Then, private agents rationally form their expectations of the inﬂation rate and
set their wage rate accordingly, before observing the current values of the shocks
which hit the economy. Finally, after observing these values, the central banker
determines the money supply according to his preferences.
Of particular concern is the inﬂuence of the divergence of preferences be-
tween the two governments on the type of the chosen central banker, and hence
on the outcomes of the game.
3.1 Solution of the delegation game.
Once the central banker is chosen, he is free to select the money supply rule he
prefers. It is assumed that there is a deterministic identity link between money
supply and the inﬂation rate, so that we can consider that the central banker
chooses the inﬂation rate.







(y + πt − πe
t + εt − y∗)2 + λB(πt)2¤
πe
t given. (4)
12The loss of government i depends on the two variances because it is aﬀected by the
aggregate inﬂation rate.
6Private agents rationally form their expectations of inﬂation before observ-














Aggregate output obtains by substituting equation (6) in (1):




The solution of this stage leads to the usual consequences of delegation. On
average, the inﬂation rate is not zero. A discretionary monetary policy generates
an inﬂationary bias βB equal to k
λB, which would be avoided if the monetary
authority could follow a rule with precommitment. However, actual output is
not equal to its natural level as it also depends on the current value of the shock
(cf. (7)). Hence, there exists a trade-oﬀ between the ﬁght against inﬂation and
the stabilization of output.
Let us now turn to the choice of the central banker by the two govern-
ments. Governments have no information on the values of the supply shocks
when they jointly choose the central banker. Their choice results from a Nash
bargaining process where γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) denotes the relative bargaining power
of government 1.
The central banker’s type, or equivalently the λB coeﬃcient, is obtained by














i is government i’s welfare loss in case of deadlock.13 Hereafter, for
simplicity reasons, we shall assume that LN
1 = LN
2 = LN.T o a v o i d t h e o c -
currence of deadlock in the bargaining process, we shall make the assumption
that LN is bigger than the loss obtained by any government in the case of a




2)) > 0 ∀(λ1,λ 2,γ,k,σ2
1,σ2
2),i =1 ,2. (9)
























13For example, a lack of agreement about the choice of the ﬁrst ECB president may have
been harmful (lack of credibility of the ECB and the EMU process, refusal of a country to enter
in the EMU...). In the case of a nation state, a lack of agreement about the central banker to
be named may reﬂect a political crisis (freeze of the decisions, political instability,...).



















































The solving of this equation gives us the bargained delegation solution λB.
It is clear from this equation that the views of the two governments with respect
to the choice of the inﬂation rate may diﬀer, not only because their preferences
diﬀer but also because the two variances play opposite roles in the ﬁrst-order
condition. In the following sub-section, we study the impact of exogenous pa-
rameters on the choice of the central banker and on the resulting discretionary
policy.
3.2 Properties of the solution
Rogoﬀ exploited the idea that for strategic reasons, in general no one wants
to appoint herself as central banker but prefers to appoint a more conservative
candidate, as the delegation allows to manipulate the anticipations of private
agents. The same feature is at work here. But, in addition, the fact that the
chosen central banker will evenly consider both parts of the monetary union
also aﬀects one’s view on the "adequate" central banker to choose. Taking into
account of possible divergences between governments’ preferences leads us to
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 i/ The conservatism degree of the central banker chosen by
bargaining is a convex combination of the conservatism degrees of the central
bankers desired by each government without bargaining.
ii/ Whatever the set of parameters, the conservatism degree of the chosen
central banker is an increasing function of the conservatism degree of either
government, an increasing function of the bargaining ratio γ and an ambigous
function of the variance ratio θ ≡ σ2
2/σ2
1.
iii/ The inﬂation bias βB is a decreasing function of the bargaining ratio γ
and an ambiguous function of the variance ratio θ.
Pr o o f .See Appendix A.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 characterizes the compromise reached by
governments over the selection of the central banker through their bargaining
process. The farther apart they are, the farther are their best preferred central
bankers. The one actually selected will be a compromise between these two types
of bankers wished by either government (λB1 and λB2): the larger the distance
between λB1 and λB2, the farther from the types of bankers preferred by either
government is λB. As this distance is an increasing function of governments’
8conservatism degrees, the farther apart their preferences, the farther from the
types of bankers wished by either government is λB.
The second part of Proposition 1 (Proposition 1-ii/) addresses the issue of
the sensitivity of the chosen degree of conservatism to the characteristics of both
governments. It makes explicit the strategic relationship between governments.
In particular, Proposition 1-ii/ claims that for small values of γ, the higher
θ, the less conservative the appointed central banker. Whereas for high values
of γ, the relation is reversed (the higher θ, the more conservative the appointed
central banker). For small values of γ, government 2 has high inﬂuence on the
choice of the central banker. Remember that it gives a larger relative weight
to the stabilization objective and suﬀers from relatively high output variabil-
ity relative to country 1. Hence, the higher θ, the bigger the loss generated by
the occurrence of shocks in country 2, the less conservative the central banker
whished by government 2 and ﬁnally appointed. Government 1 has a higher
aversion towards inﬂation and the occurrence of relatively large shocks in coun-
try 2 will imply a looser monetary policy than the one the central banker would
implement if he only considers country 1’s economy. In order to ﬁght this ten-
dency, the higher θ, the more conservative the central banker supported by
government 1.
Proposition 1-ii/ also claims that an increase in conservatism of any gov-
ernment, whatever its degree of conservatism relative to the other government,
leads to a more conservative central banker. This is fairly in accordance with
what was expected. But this gives some insights on new issues that are worth
future investigation.
In the present paper, we assume that governments do not disguise their
preference toward inﬂation and do not cheat. Proposition 1-ii/ suggests that
there are ample reasons for cheating on one’s true aversion toward inﬂation.
Consider for example the most conservative government. Given the degree of
conservatism announced by the other government, it has every reason to claim a
higher aversion toward inﬂation. By so doing, the selected banker will be more
conservative than if it had revealed its true degree of conservatism and will be-
come closer to λB1, the conservatism degree wished by government 1. The same
is true for the less inﬂation averse government: it too has an interest in claim-
ing a lower degree of conservatism. In other words, cheating is an attempt to
overcome the obligation to compromise through bargaining. Remark that there
is a lower limit to the announced degree of aversion toward inﬂation for the
less inﬂation averse government, as it cannot claim more than being indiﬀerent
toward inﬂation. On the contrary, there is no limit to the announced degree of
aversion toward inﬂation for the most conservative government. This govern-
ment has then a strategic advantage over the less inﬂation averse government.
Since the latter can at most announce that it is indiﬀerent toward inﬂation, the
most conservative government can claim such a high dislike of inﬂation that
the chosen central banker is in accordance with its true goal. Hence, in such a
setting, it is likely that there is an ingrained bias toward conservatism. It is
then of real importance that revelation mechanisms are implemented so as to
induce governments to reveal their true preferences.
9The last part of Proposition 1 is consistent with bargaining theory and
merely states that the inﬂation bias (or equivalently the degree of conservatism)
of the appointed central banker decreases (increases) with the power of the most
conservative government.
4 Comparing delegation and discretion with bargain-
ing.
We now move to the comparison of outcomes of delegation and discretion (i.e.
direct bargaining over monetary decision) in a monetary union. The ﬁrst step is
to assess the course of discretionary monetary policy when governments directly
bargain over the inﬂation rate.
4.1 Discretion with bargaining.
We consider that governments do not delegate monetary policy to a central
banker chosen by bargaining but directly bargain over the inﬂation rate to
enforce. In such a setting, the stages of the game are as follows. Before observing
the current values of shocks, private agents rationally form their expectation of
the inﬂation rate and ﬁx their wage rate. Then governments, after observing
the current values of shocks, decide over the money supply by following a Nash
bargaining process.
In this framework, the bargaining programme is the following:
max
π [LN − (LC
1 (λ1,λ 2,γ,k,σ2
1,σ2






Using equations (1), (2) and logarithms, we get:
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πt
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Private agents rationally form their expectations:
πe
t = Et−1πt. (13)
The ﬁrst-order condition is given by:
γ
−(πt − πe
t + ε1t − k) − λ1πt
LN − 1
2(πt − πe
t + ε1t − k)2 − λ1
2 πt2+(1−γ)
−(πt − πe
t + ε2t − k) − λ2πt
LN − 1
2(πt − πe
t + ε2t − k)2 − λ2
2 πt2 =0 .
(14)
The Nash equilibrium is determined by the system of equations formed by
equations (14) and (13).
Let βC denote the inﬂationary bias in the case of direct bargaining over the
inﬂation rate. It is then possible to determine the inﬂationary bias in the case
10of direct bargaining, by using (14) in the absence of shock. In this case, the









2 (βC)2 =0 (15)
⇔ ψ(βC,λ 1,λ 2,γ)=0 (16)
The properties of this solution are detailed in the following:







decreasing function of the bargaining power ratio γ.
Pr o o f .See appendix B.
This proposition is consistent with standard bargaining theory. The bar-
gained solution is bounded by the two solutions wished by the two governments.
The more power a government enjoys, the more able it is to draw the bargained
solution towards its desired one.
4.2 Comparison with the delegation outcome.
We are now able to compare the outcomes of both institutional settings, in par-
ticular with respect to the inﬂationary bias. Comparing inﬂation biases under
the two schemes for monetary policy is the object of the following proposition:
Proposition 3 There exist values of the set of parameters, when γ is closed to
0, such that λB2 <λ 2, and therefore βB >β C.
Pr o o f .See appendix C.
This result is at variance with Rogoﬀ’s classical result: it proves that the
nomination of an independent central banker does not always lead to a lower
inﬂation bias when it happens in a monetary union with asymmetric shocks
and when the nomination is obtained through bargaining between governments
with diﬀerent objectives. Clearly, the trade-oﬀs involved in the case of multiple
bargaining governments are more complex than when a single government freely
chooses an independent central banker.
This can be explained as follows, using a simple example. Consider the
case when government 2 has almost all power about monetary policy, either
when it directly controls the union’s money supply or when it appoints the
central banker (γ close to 0). Suppose in addition that the variance of the
shock aﬀecting country 2 is very large relative to the variance of the shock
aﬀecting country 1 (θ large). Government 2 is much in favor of stabilizing output
as it suﬀers from relatively high variability relative to country 1. It knows
that the chosen central banker will adopt a broad view on the functioning of
the monetary union, looking at the aggregate output, which is less variable
than country 2’s. In order to achieve its goal, government 2 has an interest in
appointing a low inﬂation-averse central banker. It may even have an interest
in appointing a central banker who is less conservative than itself (the central
11banker is not bounded from below by λ2). By so doing, it counters the balanced
view of the independent central banker. We refer to this case as the appointment
of a "lax" central banker. This leads to a high inﬂation bias. This inﬂation
bias k/λB, as a result, depends on the relative variances of shocks and is higher
than the inﬂationary bias in the case of direct bargaining. In the latter case,
the highest possible value for the inﬂation bias is k/λ2 (the inﬂation bias when
government 2 has the whole bargaining power).
Turning now to the crucial issue of the welfare property of delegation, Rogoﬀ
proved that delegation is always to be preferred to discretion, because of the
reduction in the inﬂationary bias, even though a drawback of nominating a
more conservative central banker than the ruling government is that it lessens
the stabilization properties of monetary policy.14 However, in the presence of
bargaining in a monetary union, we cannot extend Rogoﬀ’s claim as we are able
to establish the following:
Proposition 4 There exist values of the exogenous parameters (λ1,λ 2,γ,k,σ2
1,σ2
2)
such that either government 1 or government 2 prefers discretion with direct
bargaining over delegation.
Pr o o f .See appendix D.
This proposition states that it is not systematically true that delegation of
monetary policy to an independent central banker chosen by bargaining in a
monetary union is always preferred to direct bargaining by all parties involved in
the decision: there are cases where at least one party prefers direct bargaining.
This can be explained as follows.
Consider government 2. Suppose that it has (almost) all bargaining power,
but has a very inﬂation-averse partner having shocks with low variance. When
government 2 directly exerts monetary policy, it only takes into consideration its
own situation. But in the case of delegation, as the independent central banker
adopts a balanced view, this may lead government 2 to choose a "lax" delegate,
implying an inﬂa t i o nb i a sw h i c hm a yb em u c hh i g h e rt h a nt h ei n ﬂation bias
under direct bargaining (as seen in Proposition 3). On the whole, although
government 2 can choose the central banker it prefers, it will be worse oﬀ in the
case of delegation, as it will have a higher inﬂation and a less eﬃcient output
stabilization.
Government 1 may also prefers direct bargaining. Suppose that it has (al-
most) no bargaining power, is very averse to inﬂation but faces a low inﬂation-
averse government in country 2. Then, it knows that in the case of delega-
tion, government 2 will eﬃciently push for a lax central banker, deﬁnitely less
inﬂation-averse than itself (from Proposition 3). As it very strongly dislikes
inﬂation, it prefers to let government 2 directly control monetary policy. This
explains the proposition.
Then an immediate corollary follows from this proposition:
Corollary 5 There exist values of the exogenous parameters (λ1,λ 2,γ,k,σ2
1,σ2
2)
14However, it is known that the Rogoﬀ delegation scheme is not optimal. On this point, see
Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998) and Svensson (1997).
12such that both governments prefer discretion with direct bargaining over delega-
tion.
Pr o o f .See Appendix E.
This corollary sheds new light on the constitutional design of a monetary
union: it states that it may happen that countries forming a monetary union
may be better oﬀ by not establishing an independent central bank, but by di-
rectly bargaining over monetary policy. To be more explicit, suppose that the
creation of a monetary union involves a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, which
is a-temporal, that is before the actual working of the economy, both govern-
ments must decide over the institutions of the monetary union to be created:
namely, they choose non-cooperatively between direct bargaining and delega-
tion with bargaining over the selection of the central banker. In the second
stage, the economy is working through an inﬁnite sequence of periods, and is
properly described by the model we set up in section 2. In any stage, each gov-
ernment is concerned with the welfare of the representative agent of its country.
Then, the above corollary states that direct bargaining can be the unique equi-
librium of this two-stage game. In other words, there are circumstances where
governments choose not to create an independent central bank for the union.
The case for an independent central bank is therefore not overwhelming in a
monetary union.
4.3 Simulations and special cases
For the sake of analytical tractability, the previous propositions were established
using extreme cases for values of some parameters. In particular, the bargaining
power ratio γ was assumed to be equal or close to zero. Is the result that the
inﬂation bias is bigger under delegation than under discretion in the presence of
bargaining robust enough? To answer this question, we resort to simulations.15
A ﬁrst set of simulations proves that the result that the inﬂation bias is larger
under delegation is robust. Table 1 gives us the intervals for values of γ such
that the inﬂation bias is lower under direct bargaining than under delegation to
an independent central banker, for various values of θ. The values for the other
parameters are the following: LN =1 0 5,k=1 ,σ2
1 =1 ,λ 1 =2 ,λ 2 =0 .5. Some
telling graphics representing the inﬂation biases in both regimes in function of
the bargaining power γ are given in Appendix F.
θ 1 5 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200
γ none none none none none [0,0.34] [0,0.41] [0,0.57] [0,0.68] [0,0.79]
Table 1
Two facts are noticeable:
15Given the high non-linearity of the optimization programmes, it is impossible to solve
them analytically. Our simulations were achieved using Mathematica.T h e c o m p l e t e s e t o f
simulations may be found on : http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/kempf/english/cv.htm.
Here we highlight some telling results.
131. The upper limit of the interval is increasing in σ2
2, that is in θ. The higher
the country 2’s variance, the higher the upper threshold value for γ. This
is not inconsistent with what we obtained in Proposition 3.
2. More importantly, the superiority of the inﬂation bias βB over βC hap-
pens for not extreme values of θ and γ. For example, when θ is above
(or equal to) 40, the interval includes positive values of γ. This interval
increases with θ. On the whole, the range of parameter values for which
this happens is rather large.
These two facts perfectly match our explanations given to Proposition 3.
Simulations allow to point to another interesting stylized fact. For other sets
of parameters, the interval for values of γ such that βB is superior to βC may
have a non null lower bound. The result of a lower inﬂa t i o nb i a si nt h ec a s eo f
direct bargaining is obtained for intermediate values of θ. Table 2 gives such
intervals obtained by simulations for the following values of the parameters:
LN =1 0 5,k=1 ,σ 2
1 =1 ,λ 1 =5 ,λ 2 =0 .2. Some telling graphics representing
the inﬂation biases in both regimes in function of the bargaining power γ are
g i v e ni nA p p e n d i xF .
θ 1 5 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200
γ none none none none [0.1,0.41] [0.06,0.47] [0.05,0.51] [0.01,0.65] [0,0.77] [0,0.9]
Table 2
The diﬀerence with the previous set of simulations comes from the higher
discrepancy in inﬂation aversion between the two governments. When γ is low
and close to zero, the inﬂation bias is lower under delegation in the case of
intermediate values of θ: in this situation, even when it retains (almost) all
power, government 2 is not willing to name a central banker less inﬂation averse
than itself as the gains in terms of stabilization are not that high (the variance of
shocks in country 2 is not large). On the other hand, when γ is close enough to 1,
government 1 has (almost) all power. As it is highly inﬂation averse, it chooses
am o r ei n ﬂation averse central banker than itself and the inﬂation bias is then
clearly lower than in the case of discretion. For intermediate values of γ, the
inﬂation bias is however higher when delegating monetary policy. Consider the
lower bound of the interval for values of γ such that βB is superior to βC:w i t hγ
close to zero, government 2 appoints a central banker who is more conservative
than itself. However, if there is a high discrepancy in inﬂation aversion between
both governments, the central banker may be less conservative than government
1. Suppose that γ increases. Then, government 1 has more bargaining power.
In the direct bargaining regime, it will use this higher bargaining power to
implement a tighter monetary policy, which reduces the inﬂation bias βC.I n
the delegation regime, it will use its higher bargaining power to appoint a more
conservative central banker. However, it is not suﬃcient to counterbalance
the fact that the central banker adopt an even view, looking at the aggregate
output. Then, the inﬂation bias βB is reduced but it decreases less strongly
than when government 1 directly bargains over monetary policy. On the whole,
14the inﬂation bias is lower in the case of direct bargaining for a range of values
of γ (which becomes larger when θ increases), until government 1 has enough
bargaining power to appoint a suﬃciently conservative central banker (more
conservative than itself).
Finally, the result still obtains when the two variances are equal, admittedly
for high values of variances (see Appendix F). However, equal variances of shock
do not mean that shocks are symmetrical when shocks are not correlated. The
asymmetry between both countries results from not correlated shocks with high
extend.
In brief, according to our simulations, the relevance of Proposition 3 seems to
be rather large. The superiority of an independent central banker over discretion
in delivering a lower inﬂation bias is not to be taken for granted in a monetary
union.
5C o n c l u s i o n .
In this paper, we studied the issue of delegating monetary policy to a central
banker in the framework of a standard macro model of a monetary union,
when there are two governments involved in monetary policy matters. These
two governments bargain over monetary decisions. In particular they may either
directly and jointly decide over monetary policy or select an independent central
banker.
First, we established several properties of the solution of the delegation
game, in particular the impact of bargaining and shocks asymmetries (captured
by a ratio of the shocks variances). Second, we compared the delegation scheme
in the presence of bargaining with the alternative scheme of direct bargaining.
We showed that delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker
does not necessarily generate a lower inﬂationary bias nor is always welfare
improving for any government. When forming a monetary union, under some
external circumstances, it may happen that both governments prefer a union
without an independent central banker but with direct bargaining. Hence,
the systematic superiority of delegation over discretion obtained by Rogoﬀ in
the case of a single policymaker dealing with a single shock does not hold
anymore in the case of a monetary union when a plurality of governments
jointly controlling monetary policy is introduced and when these governments
bargain over monetary matters.
These theoretical results, obtained in an overly simpliﬁed macro model,
cast an interesting light over the set-up of EMU. Economic theory has been
inﬂuential in the design of EMU’s institutions. It was decided in the Maastricht
Treaty that the European System of Central Banks be (fairly) independent.
EMU is typically a case where bargaining matters: member countries have
to bargain over the selection of the committee in charge of monetary policy.
Obviously, our results do not ap r i o r ijustify this decision without qualiﬁcations.
They suggest that the superiority of the chosen scheme depends on the various
structural elements of the economy, and in particular on the inﬂation aversions
and relative bargaining powers of member countries. True, our model is not
15fully in accordance with EMU’s complex institutions. In the EMU, bargaining is
taking place both for the choice of the members of the Executive Board of the
European Central Bank itself, but also within the Governing Council, where
delegates of member countries (the governors of the national central banks)
sit. Still, it suggests that the positive and normative properties of the chosen
institutional framework are far from clear and that a close attention to the
consequences of bargaining is central to such understanding.
Moreover, our results may explain why the transition phase has been care-
fully designed and planned. Germany was particularly reluctant to renounce
to the Deutsche Mark and share a common currency with other countries Ger-
mans considered as more lenient toward inﬂation. Before EMU, Germany could
independently decide about monetary policy. Despite their sovereignty over
monetary policy, the other European countries had to more or less stringently
follow the German monetary leadership. In the early nineties, following Ger-
man reuniﬁcation, they had to bear high nominal and real interest rates, set
to accommodate German macroeconomic needs only. Once EMU enforced, this
would radically change: having a common monetary policy, Germany feared to
be in an unfavorable position and to accept compromises with countries char-
acterized by low inﬂation aversion. Even the high degree of independence of the
European Central Bank16 was not enough to alleviate these fears. The above
propositions explain why these fears could have been justiﬁed. Germany could
well have been placed in the position of government 1 in our model: a very
conservative government having to compromise in a weak bargaining position
with partners weakly committed to ﬁght inﬂation. This could well lead to a
high inﬂation rate, much higher than what was considered as acceptable by the
German authorities and people. It was then crucial for Germany to get ﬁrm
assurances from her partners about their conversion to high aversion toward
inﬂation and therefore be sure that the independence of the European Central
Bank would indeed lead to a low enough inﬂation bias. This explains both the
strong provisions of the transition toward EMU, included in the Maastricht
Treaty and the important role played by the head of the Bundesbank in the
early design of European monetary policy. Germany asked for guarantees from
her would-be partners, in terms of their commitment toward ﬁghting inﬂation
and the reduction of preference divergences over inﬂation.
The present model could be enlarged in several ways. First, we have assumed
that governments’ preferences only diﬀer in the degree of aversion toward in-
ﬂation. This could be modiﬁed. We could consider diﬀerences between govern-
ments in target values both for inﬂation and output. This would lead to ex post
antagonism between countries. Second, we assumed away any moral hazard
16Legally, the statutes of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European
C e n t r a lB a n k( E C B )m a n d a t et h a tn om e m b e ro ft h e i rd e c i s i o n - m a k i n gb o d i e si st os e e ko r
take instructions from the Community institutions and bodies, the governments of the Member
States or any other body. The Eurosystem may not grant loans to Community body or national
government entities. The ECB has its own budget and its capital has been subscribed and
paid up by the national central banks. The members of the ESCB’s decision-making bodies
have long terms of oﬃce and cannot be dismissed (except for serious misconduct or inability
to perform their duties).
16problem by assuming that governments truthfully report their real objective
functions. In reality, there is scope in such a setting for strategic misrepresen-
tation by any government of its true aversion relative to inﬂation. Our results
point to the temptation for any government to disguise its true objectives and to
attempt to bias the collective decision in a direction more favorable to its actual
objectives. In particular, our analysis points to a structural advantage for the
more inﬂation-averse parties, which would lead to an unduly restrictive mone-
tary policy stance. This insight has to be conﬁrmed by more elaborate analyses.
Clearly informational asymmetries are a major element in understanding the
consequences of bargaining.
Finally, other schemes justifying the independence of a central bank have
been oﬀered in the literature, besides the simple scheme of appointing a central
banker which turns out to be conservative. Whether these schemes are still
supporting the independence of the central bank when bargaining is involved is
an interesting question.17
These various extensions are left to future research.
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19A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1-i/
The proof of proposition 1-i/ is done in three steps.
A) λBi is an increasing function of λi.C o n s e q u e n t l y , s i n c e λ1 >λ 2,i t
implies λB1 >λ B2.
If government i could choose alone the central banker, it would choose a
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2 (1 + λi)
(1 + λBi)3 =0 ⇔ (19)
ξ(λBi,λ i,k , σ 2
i,σ2
j)=0 . (20)
The variation of λBi as a function of λi can be studied by applying the
implicit function theorem to function ξ(λBi,λ i,k , σ 2
i,σ2





,w h e r eξx is the derivative (19) relative to variable x. The sign of dλBi
dλi
is the sign of −
ξλi
ξλB
.F o r λBi to be a minimum, it is necessary that ξλBi be
positive. The sign of dλBi













(1 + λBi)3 < 0.
dλBi
dλi is therefore positive.
B) λB is a continuous increasing function of γ.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the bargaining programme (8) is given by equa-







,w h e r eϕx is the derivative of (11) relative to variable x.T h e
sign of dλB
dγ is the sign of −
ϕγ
ϕλB
. For λB to be a maximum, it is necessary that
ϕλB be negative. The sign of dλB









































Remark that ϕγ = f1/g1 − f2/g2 where f1 is the numerator of the ﬁrst frac-
tion, g1 its denominator, f2 the numerator of the second fraction and g2 its
20denominator. According to our assumption on LN, g1 > 0 and g2 > 0.I f
(1−λ2+2λB) < 0,t h e n f2 > 0. But (1−λ2+2λB) < 0 implies (1−λ1+2λB) < 0
as λ1 >λ 2. Then, f1 > 0. However, one cannot simultaneously get f2 > 0 and
f1 > 0. Hence (1 − λ2 +2 λB) is positive, and the sign of f2 is ambiguous.
Similarly, since the sign of (1 − λ1 +2 λB) is ambiguous, so is the sign of f1.
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Each term in N1 is known to be positive, except − σ2
1
λ1
λ2 (1 + λ2) which is
negative and −σ2




















(1 + λB)3 > 0
But one cannot simultaneously get f1 > 0 and f2 > 0 as the LHS term in
equation (11) cannot be zero. Therefore, f2 has to be negative. Then, because
of (11), f1 cannot be negative as one cannot simultaneously get f1 < 0 and f2
< 0. Hence, f2 < 0 and f1 > 0. Finally, ϕγ = f1/g1 −f2/g2 > 0.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
λB is an increasing function of γ.
C) Obviously, λB = λB1 if γ =1 ;λB = λB2 if γ =0 .
Finally, because of these three steps,λ B is a convex combination of λB1 and
λB2, depending on γ.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1-ii/
A) According to step B in appendix A.1, λB is a continuous increasing













, we now prove that λB is an increasing
function of λ1 and λ2.







,w h e r eϕx is the derivative of (11) relative to variable x.T h e
sign of dλB
dλ1 is the sign of −
ϕλ1
ϕλB
. For λB to be a maximum, it is necessary that
ϕλB be negative. The sign of dλB
dλ1 is therefore the sign of ϕλ1 deﬁned as:


























































































(1+λB)3 > 0 (see appendix A.1, step B). Thus,
dλB
dλ1 > 0.







,w h e r eϕx is the derivative of (11) relative to variable x.T h e
sign of dλB
dλ2 is the sign of −
ϕλ2
ϕλB
. For λB to be a maximum, it is necessary that
ϕλB be negative. The sign of dλB
dλ2 is therefore the sign of ϕλ2 deﬁned as:
















































































The term in brace brackets is ambiguous (see appendix A.1, step B). However,
we can show that ϕλ2 is positive if LN is suﬃciently large (which is what we
assume). Consider for example that LN ≥ 2L2. Then:






























































All the terms inside the brace brackets are positive. Thus ϕλ2 > 0 and dλB
dλ2 > 0.







, we prove that λB is an ambiguous
function of θ ≡ σ2
2/σ2
1.θcaptures the asymmetry of the shocks of both countries.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the bargaining programme (8), given by equation


























































which is equivalent to:
ϕ(λB,λ 1,λ 2,γ,θ,L N,k,σ2
1)=0






,w h e r eϕx is the derivative of function ϕ(λB,λ 1,λ 2,γ,θ,L N,k,σ2
1)
relative to variable x.T h e s i g n o f dλB
dθ is the sign of −
ϕθ
ϕλB
. For λB to be a
maximum, it is necessary that ϕλB be negative. The sign of dλB
dθ is therefore
the sign of ϕθ deﬁned as:
ϕθ = γ · [A]−2 · B +( 1− γ) · [C]−2 · D






























































































(1+λB)3 ] < 0.
Then, the sign of ϕθ is ambiguous and depends on the value of γ.I fγ =0 ,
ϕθ < 0.I fγ =1 , ϕθ > 0. There exists a value γ∗ ∈ [0,1] such as:
ϕθ < 0, ∀γ<γ ∗ and ϕθ > 0, ∀γ>γ ∗.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1-iii/
We now study the impact of γ over the inﬂationary bias in case of delegation
βB. This bias is equal to k





















23As λB is comprised between λB1 and λB2, the minimal and maximal values
of the inﬂationary bias when delegating are the following ones: ifγ =1 ,β B =
k











Hence, the inﬂationary bias with delegation is a decreasing function of the
bargaining power coeﬃcient, having a minimal value k
λB2,w h e nγ =0 ,a n da
maximal value k
λB1, when γ =1 .
B Proof of Proposition 2.
O n ec a n n o tg e tβC > k
λ2 as it implies k − λ2βC < 0 and k − λ1βC < 0, which
is impossible since the LHS term in the ﬁrst-order condition (14) must be zero.
Similarly, one cannot get βC < k
λ1 as it implies k−λ2βC > 0 and k−λ1βC > 0.
Hence, βC < k
λ2 ,i . e .k − λ2βC > 0 and βC > k
λ1,o rk − λ1βC < 0. Applying
the implicit function theorem to ψ(βC,λ 1,λ 2,γ) (cf. (16)), it can be shown
that the inﬂationary bias with direct bargaining is a decreasing function of γ







ψβc is negative since βC is a maximum. The sign of
dβC
dγ is therefore the same










As k − λ2βC > 0 and k − λ1βC < 0, this implies that: ψγ < 0. Hence
dβC
dγ <
0. From (15), the minimal and maximal values of βC on [0,1] can easily be
computed. Ifγ =1 ,β C = k
λ1. Ifγ =0 ,β C = k
λ2. Then, k
λ1 <β C < k
λ2.
The inﬂationary bias with direct bargaining is a decreasing function of γ on
[0,1], with a minimal value k
λ2 when γ =0and a maximal value k
λ1 when γ =1 .
C Proof of proposition 3.
Consider the case where γ =0 . Then, the programme leading to the nomination










































(1 − λ2 +2 λB)
(1 + λB)3 . (24)
24We have to prove that for some values of parameters, the central banker is less
conservative than government 2 (i.e. λB <λ 2). We consider the case where
σ2
1 = k = λ2 =1 . Then, θ = σ2












(1 + λB)3 ≡ Ω(θ,λB).
Ωθ is clearly negative and ΩλB is also negative (as λB is a maximum). Using
the implicit function theorem as in step A, in the proof of Prop.1-i., λB is a
decreasing function of θ.F o r θ =1 7 , we get λB =1as it is the sole positive
solution. Hence, for higher values of θ, λB is inferior to 1=λ2. By continuity,
this is true for values of γ close enough to 0.
D Proof of proposition 4.
A - The case for government 2.
Consider a given vector of parameters (LN,λ 1,λ 2,γ,k,σ2
1,σ2
2).W eh a v et o
prove that for some values of this vector, Government 2 is not better-oﬀ with
the negotiated assignment of an independent central banker than with a direct
bargaining over discretionary monetary policy. Clearly, we have to reason on



















First, we consider the case where γ =0 . In this case, λB = λB2. We have to
prove that, for some values of the parameters, government 2 is better oﬀ with
discretion than with delegation of monetary policy to a central banker chosen
by bargaining, when it retains all bargaining power. Hence, it suﬃces to prove












































































18At some periods, for a high enough shock, it may happen that both governments would
have preferred to use discretionary powers at the expense of the inﬂation bias. This is not








































B2 +4 λB2 (1 − λ2)+λ2
2 − 2λ2
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Given Prop. 1-ii and Prop. 3, this diﬀerence is positive for λ2 =1 /2 and θ
suﬃciently large, so that λB2 <λ 2.
By a continuity argument, this is true for values of γ close enough to 0.
B- The case for government 1.



































































= A + Bσ2
1 + Cσ2
2. (30)
A>0 and C>0 if λB2 <λ 2, and B>0 if λ1 > 3+4λB2. I nt h ec a s ew h e n
λ2 =1 /2, λ1 > 3+4 λ2 =4 .5 and θ suﬃciently large such that λB2 <λ 2 imply
that (30) is positive.
By a continuity argument, this is true for values of γ close enough to 0.
E Proof of Corollary.
Immediate from Proposition 4, with γ close to zero, λ1 suﬃciently large and λ2
suﬃciently small, θ suﬃciently large.
F Simulations
Appendix F shows some telling graphics representing the inﬂation biases in
both regimes in function of the bargaining power γ.
A/ First set of simulations (ﬁgure 1 : graphics 1 to 3):
We consider the following values of parameters: LN =1 0 5,k =1 ,σ2
1 =
1,λ 1 =2 ,λ 2 =0 .5.
B/ Second set of simulations (ﬁg u r e2:g r a p h i c s4t o6 ) :
We consider the following values of parameters: LN =1 0 5,k =1 ,σ2
1 =
1,λ 1 =5 ,λ 2 =0 .2.
C/ Third set of simulations (ﬁgure 3 : graphics 7 to 9). We impose θ =1
We consider the following values of parameters: LN =1 0 5,k =1 ,λ 1 =
2,λ 2 =0 .5
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